2 APR 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George A. Carver, Jr.

Deputy to the DCI for National

Intelligence Officers

SUBJECT

: Force Projections

- 1. I generally agree with the proposals forwarded in your 22 March memorandum for resolving the community's force projection problem, but believe that the recommendations are not explicit enough on certain points to represent a full solution.
- 2. As I read it, the proposal has the following elements:
  - a. There should continue to be a DIPP prepared and published by DIA to meet the DOD's annual requirement for force projections to assist defense agency and command planning of forces and budgets. These projections must be detailed and thorough; the "high-best-low" format seems best suited to DOD's requirements.
  - b. National Intelligence Estimates on major foreign military forces should continue to contain projective estimates and judgments, as well as line projections as needed. These projections may vary in scope, detail, and purpose, depending on the needs of national security policymaking.
    - c. NIE projections should be fully coordinated within the community and be developed in close working-level cooperation between the appropriate components of CIA and DIA. Several projections working groups could serve as the instruments of this cooperation.

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d. The DIPP should derive from and agree with projective estimates and judgments in relevant NIEs--for example, possible and probable levels of missile accuracy improvement, numbers of major new systems entering the force, maximum and likely pace of deployment, etc.--even though the level of detail and format of the DIPP and the NIEs differ. Guided by nationally-agreed projective judgments, DIA need not coordinate the DIPP with other USIB agencies.

recommends that CIA should collaborate with DIA, short of full coordination, in preparing the DIPP. OSR has expressed concern that this collaboration could become extremely time consuming because of the scope and detail of the DIPP. share this concern. In my view, there should be no need for detailed CIA-DIA collaboration on the DIPP if the most crucial projective judgments employed in the DIPP have already been developed through thorough CIA-DIA collaboration on projections in NIEs. (In my view, this collaboration between CIA and DIA on the DIPP should extend only so far as to assure that the DIPP reflects nationally-agreed projective judgments or, if DIA chooses to depart from those judgments because of later evidence or disagreement with a National Intelligence Estimate, that those differences are thoroughly aired and substantiated.)

- 4. In my view, the foregoing guidance is a suitable basis on which to proceed. But to put the projections house fully in order, I believe we must take several further steps:
  - a. The user agencies should be canvassed for more explicit guidance as to the kind of projections they require in National Intelligence Estimates, the kinds of issues they wish to see addressed, the level of detail desired, the need for a "best" national estimate, etc.

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b. Inasmuch as the DIPP should derive from judgments in national estimates the time schedule on which NIEs and the DIPP are prepared should be reviewed in the light of consumer needs. In all probability, the DIPP will continue to be needed in synchronization with the budget cycle. NIEs should in the main precede the DIPP, but the NIE schedule may vary somewhat to adapt to the flow of information and to changing policy needs. Where these factors allow the NIEs and the DIPP to get seriously "out of synch," the projections working groups and other mechanisms should be invoked to review—and perhaps revise—the most recent national projective judgments.

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

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26 March 1974

To: Director/OSR

Hank--

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You have received a copy of
paper on the relationship
between force projections in the NIE
and the DIPP which Carver sent to me
and I would like your comments
and recommendations.

I was In readingL struck by one key aspect which seemed to have been muted. Originally, the IAP was established to provide a more detailed amplification of the estimates in the NIE and to extend these estimates beyond the time period in the NIE. The basic concept was that the estimates and projections in the NIE would be the nationally agreed numbers; the IAP (and thus the DIPP) would be derived from the NIE for providing military planners greater detail than would be included in the NIE and to give them numbers to work with for the period beyond which estimates could be made with confidence. I believe that this principle should be preserved. If it is preserved, then there is no reason for the two documents being inconsistent and confusing.

Edward W. Proctor

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Office ( Director NIO # 56 7-74 Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000766 110028-6 # 56 7-74 of Central Intelligence



DATE: 22 March 1974

то: Mr. Knoche, D/OSR

Mr. Brandwein, D/OWI

SUBJECT:

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Attached is a package sent to Ed Proctor and which relates to matters in which you both have clear responsibilities. I did not make you addressees on the covering letter largely for form's sake. I thought noses might be disjointed if there were three CIA addressees and only one military recipient.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment

# SECRET Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000700110028-6

## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director	SP - 30/74 22 March 1974	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Dr. Edward W. Proctor Deputy Director for Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency	
	Deputy Director for Estimates Defense Intelligence Agency	25X1
SUBJECT :	Force Projections	
Admiral de Poix Strategic Prograthe problems inverse projections in Number of DIA and CIA to then convened a Drawing upon the (now Acting NIO) the requirements arising from the	sult of the recent exchange of memoranda between and Mr. Colby concerning NIE 11-8-73, the NIO for ms, Mr. Stoertz, undertook to seek a solution to olved in the treatment of strategic force ational Estimates. Mr. Stoertz and sistant NIO) first met separately with representatives o obtain their ideas about a workable solution, meeting attended by representatives of both agencies. discussions at these meetings, has prepared the attached memorandum. It reviews for strategic force projections and the problems present arrangements for their preparation; it Iternative remedies and offers specific recommen-	25X′ 25X′
(1) the clear re force projection intelligence iss	as indicated, has assessed the acceptability ves considered in light of three important factors: equirement for some quantitative data including is in National Estimates and in other national equances; (2) the fact that CIA does not wish to broke to participate fully with DIA and the other	25X1
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agencies involved in the preparation of the DIPP; (3) the need -recognized by all parties -- for basic force projections in National
Estimates and in the DIPP to be consistent, even though they may
be based on different assumptions or rationales. The recommendations in the attached paper have been drafted with these three
factors in mind.

- The attached paper recommends the establishment of a joint CIA-DIA working group to consider strategic force projections. I endorse that recommendation, and propose that this approach be extended to all force projections. As you may know, we contemplate force projections for NIE 11-15-74, which is being drafted in DIA under the NIO for Conventional Forces, and in the forthcoming SNIE 13-8-74 on Chinese strategic programs, which is being drafted in CIA under the NIO for Strategic Programs. Because the "expert" members of the proposed "Working Group on Force Projections" would vary according to subject and country, I believe that each agency should have a designated permanent representative to serve as a point of contact and to call together relevant experts from that agency to deal with different projections. This representative would ensure consistency in such matters as presentational techniques and treatment of uncertainty and would bring to the task a broader perspective on the interrelationship of different types of forces in each country.
- 4. Suggested procedures for such a Working Group are outlined in the recommendations section of the attached paper. Under the concept there proposed, the CIA member would participate in the revision of DIPP projections but would not be responsible for coordinating them. The first tasks of the Working Group would be to address the force projections called for in NIE 11-15-74 and SNIE 13-8-74.
- 5. If these proposals are acceptable to you, I will incorporate them in a memorandum from the DCI to the Director, DIA.

		George A.	. Carver,	Jr.	
Deputy	for	National	Intellige	ence	Officers

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Attachment

## SEUME!

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SP - 30/74

SUBJECT: Force Projections

Distribution:

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1 - Dr. Proctor (CIA) 1 - (DIA)

1 - Mr. Knoche (D/OŚR)

1 - Mr. Brandwein (D/OWI)

1 - D/DCI/NIO

1 - NIO/RI

1 - NIO/SP

25X1 NIO/SP (25Mar74)

#### **JEUKEI**

#### Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP80B01495R099700110028-6

22 March 1974

PROJECTIONS FOR PLANNING: REQUIREMENTS, OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### The Requirement for Projections

- 1. In 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara requested that the DCI prepare projections of Warsaw Pact forces together with characteristics of weapon systems, to be used in the annual US defense planning cycle. In response, the Intelligence Assumptions for Planning (IAP) were produced by the Office of National Estimates and approved by the USIB. Later, the IAP became the National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP). In 1970 it was agreed, in an exchange of correspondence between Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard and Mr. Helms, that the projections in the NIPP, being of primary interest to the Department of Defense, should be prepared within the DoD. As a result, the Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning (DIPP) replaced the NIPP. Since 1971, the DIPP, covering Warsaw Pact and Chinese forces, has been produced by DIA and coordinated with NSA and the intelligence components of the military services. The DIPP like its predecessors, contains a "best estimate" of the Soviet or Chinese forces. The DIPP also depicts "high" and "low" sets of projections which bound the range of likely force developments.
- 2. NSC Staff requirements for projections vary with different members of the Staff and with the nature of current policy issues. Past experience with Staff requests, however, indicates a continuing requirement for two types of strategic force projections: a "best estimate" projection and projections illustrating alternative feasible Soviet options under different assumptions. The NSC Staff also has asked that the latter projections be presented in NIEs or in related "national" studies.

#### The Problem

3. The two types of projections have been presented to the customer heretofore in separate documents, the "best estimate" projections appearing in the DIPP and, as requested by the NSC Staff, alternative projections in NIEs. This situation has led to two problems. First, the two types of projections have not necessarily been compatible nor consistent with one another. This has created the second problem, that is, confusion among users as to the most suitable projection for a given task or issue. The confusion derives, in large measure, from the fact that the alternative sets of projections in NIEs have been drawn up under different ground

### SEUKEI

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rules for different purposes than the projections in the DIPP. The problem has not been solved by explaining in the NIEs that the NIE projections were for use by the national policy machinery for their purposes, and that the DoD planner should use the DIPP.

4. As could be expected, different consumers—the NSC Staff included—have used those projections which appeared to suit their immediate needs and purposes. Projections appearing in NIEs which have been approved by the USIB have been regarded by some consumers as having greater import for defense planning than those appearing in the DIPP. This has caused DIA considerable difficulty in supporting OSD planning, and has resulted in competing analyses of defense issues based on different projections.

#### Alternative Solutions

- 5. There are several approaches to resolving these problems, ranging from major changes in procedures and publications which could involve significant CIA resources, to minor procedural changes designed to diminish customer confusion. Of the several alternative remedies considered, four are presented below. They include: (1) publish all projections only in NIEs; (2) transform the DIPP into a national publication but publish alternative projections in other departmental publications; (3) transform the DIPP into a national publication including alternative projections; (4) modify the present system to make it work better. Alternative 1 would probably not satisfy DoD requirements and would overwhelm the NIE; it therefore need not be considered further. Alternative 2 would not satisfy the requirement for projections to be associated with the NIEs and would be an additional burden on non-Dod intelligence agencies; it therefore has not been addressed in detail.
  - 6. Of the several alternatives, two merit detailed consideration.

Alternative 3. Transform the DIPP into a national publication including alternative projections. Prepared by DIA with CIA collaboration. No unique projections in NIEs.

## <u>Advantages:</u>

- --would permit NIE to concentrate on major developments, issues and judgments, and yet retain a vehicle for detailed projections
- --would give national imprimatur to best estimate and alternative force projections, as required in latter case by NSC staff
- --would present alternative force projections in explicit relationship to projections as required by DoD

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- --DIPP format would ease updating
- --would eliminate any confusion between DIPP and NIE.

#### Disadvantages:

- --would diminish usefulness of NIE, particularly implications section
- --would require high-level users to maintain DIPP, including details not useful to them
- --would require major changes in current DIA and CIA production practices
- --would make discussion in the NIE dependent on reference to other documents.

Alternative 4. Make the present system work better. Publish the DIPP in its present form including the best estimate. Publish projections as required in NIEs, in a separate annex of the NIE, or in a NIAM associated with the NIE. Establish procedures to ensure that basic assumptions for building force structures and the resulting projections in the DIPP and NIE are compatible and reasonably consistent.

#### Advantages:

- --would require minimum change in current practices of CIA and DIA while affording a community approach to preparation of force projections
- --would provide for associating of quantitative data with the text of the NIE
- --would not require CIA coordination on the details of the DIPP
- --would satisfy NSC requirement for force projections associated with the NIE
- --would eliminate inconsistency between DIPP and NIE projections through CIA-DIA collaboration in the early stages of preparing projections
- ~-would not require high-level user to maintain DIPP as reference document.

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#### <u>Disadvantages:</u>

- --would require user to refer to more than one document to obtain full set of projections (DIPP high, low, and best and NIE projections)
- --some users would give more weight to projections in NIE than to those in the DIPP
- --might not completely eliminate confusion between DIPP and NIE projections.

#### Recommendations

- 7. A revision of procedures based upon Alternative 4 is recommended as a remedy for the projections problem and to satisfy existing requirements with the least disruption of current practices and with minimal additional tasks for all agencies. Specifically, we recommend that:
  - a. DIA should continue to prepare and publish DIPP projections, including the best estimate, in their present form. Projections should continue to be published in NIEs or associated issuances, as required. The type and number of projections appearing in or associated with NIEs will be dictated by user requirements. Projections appearing in the DIPP and NIEs or associated issuances should be cross referenced so as to minimize confusion as to their purposes and relationship.
  - b. A CIA-DIA working group on projections of strategic forces should be established to ensure that the basic assumptions used in building force structures and the resulting projections themselves are compatible and consistent. The work of the joint group would continue throughout the year, but should be especially concentrated during the initial stages of preparing the annual update of the DIPP and during the initial stages of preparing projections for the annual NIE.
  - c. It would not be necessary for CIA to coordinate on the DIPP, but CIA should collaborate in its preparation through the joint working group to ensure compatibility and consistency among projections as called for in paragraph 7b. DIA would participate in preparing NIE projections through the joint working group as described in paragraph 7b and would coordinate these projections as part of the formal USIB process of preparing National Intelligence Estimates.
- 9. The above procedures hopefully will redress the force projection issue with the least possible disruption of current practices. The proposed procedures will require regular collaboration between CIA and DIA, both to deal with periodic requirements and with one-time requests for strategic force projections.

	ENT PYWING
MEMORANDUM FOR:	, O/DDI
This is the proposed to send to Carver on issue. Stoertz is ca with CIA, DIA, and Wi Thursday to discuss t	the "Projections" 1/ing a meeting O Reps this
detail.	
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